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Existence of Collateral Equilibrium without Survival 
Assumption
Jaime Orrillo
 
Resumo
Este trabalho mostra a existência de um equilíbrio com garantias, sem assumir nenhuma hipótese  sobre 
a  positividade estrita,  seja das dotações iniciais dos indivíduos (incluindo as ex-post) ou da dotação 
inicial agregada. Devido a esta falta de positividade estrita das dotações iniciais da sociedade, não temos 
um equilíbrio. Em vez disso, temos um quase-equilíbrio. Então, apelando ao conceito de irredutibilidade 
(introduzida por  McKenzie em 1959),  o qual é adaptado ao modelo com garantias, mostra-se que o 
quase–equilíbrio é, de fato, um equilíbrio legítimo. 
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Abstract
This paper shows the existence of a collateral equilibrium without assuming any hypotheses on the strict 
positivity, be they individual initial endowments, including the ex post initial endowments, or aggregated 
initial endowments. Because of dropping the strict positivity of social initial endowment we fail to get an 
equilibrium. Instead, we get a quasi-equilibrium. Then, appealing to the concept of irreducibility (intro-
duced by McKenzie in 1959) which is adapted to the collateral model, we show that the quasi-equilibrium 
is indeed a legitime equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
The word "survival" implies the existence of some event that causes hurt or the loss 
of something that prevents some activity after the catastrophe passes (catastrophe, 
in this case, means the lack of future income of all the agents). The classic models 
of general equilibrium with uncertainty assume that agents have strictly positive 
initial endowments including the ex post initial endowments (or its more weaker 
version which declares the aggregated initial endowments to be strictly positive). 
Strict positivity of initial endowments of all the agents is fundamental to guarantee 
the existence of equilibrium. However, in the real world there is no one or nothing 
that guarantees agents will have some income allowing them to trade after uncer-
tainty is solved, unless there is some mechanism which allows the transfer of posi-
tive wealth from one period to another. This mechanism could be financial markets. 
However, such financial institutions do not guarantee that the ex post wealth is at 
least non-negative, since the ex post financial income (due to asset returns) might be 
negative enough to create a non-positive total income. In this paper we will analyze 
such transfers in a GEI model by allowing agents to default on their promises. For 
this reason we require from borrowers to put aside collateral which will assume to 
be durable as in Geanakoplos and Zame (2002, 20071) (henceforth GZ).
Collateral, as a means to enforce promises, has been analyzed in the context of 
general equilibrium with incomplete markets by GZ (2002, 2007). They stress the 
importance of requiring collateral from borrowers each time the latter sell assets, 
stating that this has profound impacts on the whole economy even when there is 
no default).2 In the GZ paper several examples are offered which illustrate diverse 
situations, from consumption distortion to the effect on the volatility of prices of 
both assets and commodities.
The objective of this paper is to show existence of equilibrium without assuming 
any assumption on the strict positivity of the initial endowments including the ex 
post initial endowments or aggregated initial endowments. That is, the survival as-
sumption, which states that all individuals who have either strictly positive initial 
endowments or initial social endowments belong to the interior of the consump-
tion set, is dropped. Due to this fact we do not obtain an equilibrium but rather a 
quasi-equilibrium.
We adapt the notion of quasi-equilibrium for a collateral economy in the same way 
that Gottardi and Hens (1996) do for the case of a standard incomplete market 
model. They proved the existence of equilibrium in a GEI model with numeraire 
1 Version more recent.
2 For a broad discussion on collateral, we refer to Geanakoplos (1997).
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assets while still assuming that at least one agent has strict positive initial endow-
ments in at least one state of nature. They use the concept of irreducibility ac-
cording to McKenzie (1959) to redistribute income among all the agents so that a 
quasi-equilibrium becomes a legitimate equilibrium. We also use this concept of 
irreducibility adapted to the collateral model to get our result.
However, it is useful to stress that, contrary to Gottardi and Hens (1996), we do 
not assume strict positivity of initial endowment of any agent. To be more precise, 
all agents, in this paper, are assumed to have second-period initial endowments 
equal to zero implying contingent income zero for all agents. Besides the fact that it 
is not very realistic to assume that at least one agent has positive wealth in an envi-
ronment with uncertainty, it also provokes a serious technical problem in the agents' 
budget correspondence, namely, they fail to be lower hemi continuity. However, 
in the collateral model this problem disappears due to depreciation structure of 
goods assumed here.
The methodology used to show the existence of equilibrium is as follows: first we 
slightly modify the initial endowments of our original collateral economy so that in 
the new parameterized economy all the hypothesis imposed by GZ (2002, 2007) 
are satisfied. So our parameterized economy has an equilibrium. Next, by a limit 
process we show that the allocation of the limit economy is a quasi-equilibrium 
supported by a non-zero commodity-asset price system. We then use the fact that 
the depreciation of the first-period social endowment is strictly positive, like in GZ 
(2002, 2007) together with the market clear conditions to show that at least one 
agent has a strictly positive income. Since the agents' utility functions are strictly 
increasing the above agent with positive income will be maximizing his/her utility 
in the limit economy. Also, all the prices in the limit economy are strictly positive. 
Finally, to reach equilibrium in the limit economy we use the concept of irreduc-
ibility, in the context of a collateral economy, introduced by McKenzie.
The plan of the paper is as follows: in section 2 we describe the model by stating 
the hypotheses and defining equilibrium, quasi-equilibrium and the concept of ir-
reducibility in our setting. In it we also establish the determinateness of individual 
behavior and define the arbitrage condition. Section 3 is dedicated to the proof of 
the existence of both quasi-equilibrium and equilibrium in the collateral economy. 
Section 4 offers some conclusions. We end with an appendix containing a miscel-
laneous of notations.
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2 The Model 
We shall follow, for the most part, Geanakoplos and Zame's model (see GZ, 2002) 
with slight differences in the notation.3 To understand our notation, see the begin-
ning of the appendix. We consider a two-period exchange economy with a finite 
number H  of consumers and L  commodities. There are S  states of nature to 
be revealed in the second period, and in the first period there is just one state of 
nature (called state 0), in which H  agents trade in L  commodities and J  assets. 
Default is allowed and the lenders are protected by a collateral structure which is 
exogenously given and backs short sales issued by the borrowers. More precisely, 
the collateral is modelled by a physical commodity bundle 1= ( , , )
LJ
JC C C R+∈  
where the j – th vector backs the sale of one unit of asset .Jj∈  It is assumed that 
jC  is depreciated according to a state - contingent positive linear transformation, 
.: LLs RRY +→  Let us denote by LLLslsss RYYYY ×+∈][= 1   the matrix that repre-
sents the above positive linear transformation which is LlRY Lls ∈∈ + ,  its −l  th 
column.
Each asset Jj∈  is characterized by its promise LSj RA ×+∈  and by the collat-
eral Lj RC +∈  that backed it. Agents are characterized by their utility function 
RRU SLh →++ 1)(:  and their first- period initial endowments .Lh R+∈ω  Since default 
is permitted, each agent has the option of delivering less than he promised. If we 
assume that the commodity price system is 1)( ++∈ SLRp , the value of the promise, 
in each state s , is .jss Ap  Let 
hj
sD  denote what agent h  decides to deliver. As the 
only consequence of default is the seizure of the collateral, it then follows that 
any rational borrower will choose to deliver the minimum of the face value and 
the depreciated collateral value. Similarly, each lender expects to receive only the 
minimum between the contingent claim and the depreciated collateral value. Thus, 
the delivery on asset j  in the second period is defined as 
 },{min= jss
j
ss
j
s CYpApD
Define by ),,,(:= YCApRR  to be the matrix 
 [ ] ( 2 ) S L JpYDpYC D × +−
where the sub- matrix pY is of order LS ×  whose ),( ls  entry is the number .lssYp  
In a similar way D  and DpYC −  are the sub-matrixes of order JS ×  whose ),( js  
3 Actually, the notation comes from the old version of this model, namely Geanakoplos, Zame, 
and Dubey (1995).
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entries are, respectively, the numbers ,jsD  and .
j
sjss DCYp −  Denote by >< R  the 
sub-space generated by the columns of the matrix R  just defined.
We assume that  
Each agent •	 Hh∈  has a continuous, concave, and strictly increasing4 utility 
function ( 1):h L SU R R++ →  
> 0hoω•	  and = 0,
h
o h H−ω ∀ ∈  
To understand the meaning of the sub-index " o− '', see the miscellaneous notation 
in the appendix.
Notice that we do not require strict positivity of the initial social endowment in 
contrast to GZ (2002) who do require it.
A price system is a vector JR+∈p  of securities, and a state-contingent consumption 
price vector is .1)( ++∈ SLRp  
Definition 1: Given a price system JSL RRp +
+
+ ×∈p 1)(),(  a consumption-portfolio 
choice JSL RRx 21)(),,( +
+
+ ×∈jq  is budget-feasible for agent Hh∈  if 
 ( )ho o op x C+ j −ω +pq ≤ pj   (1)
 (2),)()( SsDCYpDxYxp ssssosss ∈j−+q≤−  (2)
The budget constraint (1) states that the cost of a net purchase of goods 
)( hooo Cxp ω−j+  plus the lending pq (due to the purchase of assets) cannot ex-
ceed the borrowing pj (due to sale of assets). The budget constraint (2) tells us 
that after Ss∈  occurred at date 1, the consumer must again decide on his net 
purchases of goods )( osss xYxp − , which must be financed from receipts of assets 
that he purchased in the first period and from net deliveries the agent makes on 
assets he sold.
Consumption-portfolio choices satisfying the budget constraint (1) and (2) define 
consumer h′  budget set: 
 ( 1) 2( , ) = {( , , ) : (1) and (2) are satisfied }h L S JB p x R R++ +p q j ∈ ×
4 GZ (2002) makes a weaker hypothesis.
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Definition 2: Given ),( pp , a budget-feasible choice ),,( jqx  for agent h  is optimal 
if there is no budget-feasible choice ),(),,( p∈jq pBx h'''  for agent h  such that 
 ),(>),( oo
h'
o
''
o
h xCxUxCxU −− j+j+
Remark: The optimality of ),,( jqx  for agent h  can be stated in an equivalent way, 
as follows: 
 ∧j+j+×∈jq∀ −−+++ ),(>),(,),,( 21)( ooh' o''ohJSL''' xCxUxCxURRx
 ( ) ( ) , ( ) >
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' h
s s s o s s s s o o o op x Y x D p Y C D s S p x C p− ≤ q + − ∈ ⇒ + j +pq −pj ω
Since the optimal is budget feasible it follows that 
 ( ) ho o o op x C p+ j + pq −pj ≤ ω .
Therefore the previous implication becomes 
 ∧j+j+×∈jq∀ −−+++ ),(>),(,),,( 21)( ooh' o''ohJSL''' xCxUxCxURRx
 SsDCYpDxYxp 'sss
'
s
'
os
'
ss ∈j−+q≤− ,)()(
                                   ⇓
 
( ) > ( )' ' ' 'o o o op x C p x C+ j + pq −pj + j + pq −pj
We define an economy as a collection of individuals, a financial structure5, and a 
depreciation structure. In symbols we have 
 = [( , ) ; ( , ); ]h ho h HE U A C Y∈ω
It is useful to point out that agents in the economy only have initial endowments 
at the beginning of the economic activity.
5 Consisting of promises and exogenous collateral.
Jaime orrillo 13
Est. econ., São Paulo, 41(1): 7-24, jan.-mar. 2011
Definition 3: (Exogenous Collateral Equilibrium)
An exogenous collateral equilibrium is a price system ),( pp , and a collection 
Hh
hhhx ∈jq ),,(  of optimal choices for the respective agents. In addition, given 
),( pp , all markets clear: 
 SCxYxCx hos
Hh
h
s
Hh
h
o
Hh
h
o
Hh
∈∀j+ωj+ ∑∑∑∑
∈∈∈∈
)],([=,=)(
 .= h
Hh
h
Hh
jq ∑∑
∈∈
Let 
 ( 1)= {( , ) : [ ] = 0L S H JH h h ho o
h H
F x R R x C++ +
∈
j ∈ × + j −ω∑
 [ ] = 0}h h ho o
h H
x Y x C−
∈
∧ − + j∑
be the set of all feasible allocations. Notice that we have put short sales as part of 
feasible allocation since the demand for durable goods used for collateral depends 
on short sales.
The question is now to know whether there is a price system for which there exists 
an equilibrium on .E  To obtain this we need to make some assumptions based on 
the characteristics of our economy.
What we will first demonstrate is the existence of a quasi-equilibrium for our col-
lateral economy which is a weaker notion than that of equilibrium. Before providing 
assumptions for our model we are going to define what a quasi-equilibrium means 
in our context.
Definition 4: (Exogenous Collateral Quasi-equilibrium)
An exogenous collateral quasi-equilibrium is a price system ),( pp , and a collection 
Hh
hhhx ∈jq ),,(  of budget-feasible choices for the respective agents. In addition, giv-
en ),( pp , all markets clear as in Definition 3 and for each agent ,Hh∈  we have 
 for all fixed ( 1) 2( , , ) , ( , ) > ( , )' ' ' L S J h ' ' ' ho o o ox R R U x C x U x C x
+
+ + − −q j ∈ × + j + j
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and 
 SsallforDCYpDxYxp ssssosss ∈j′−+q′≤− ′′ ,)()(        for a l   S
implies 
 
h
oooo pCxp ω≥j′p−q′p+j′+′
The only difference between equilibrium and quasi-equilibrium is that any choice 
which is strictly preferred to ),,( hhhx jq  and budget-feasible in each state of na-
ture of the second period must cost at least the value of the first-period initial 
endowment.
Under (A1) the investor's problem has a solution if, and only if, there are no arbi-
trage opportunities, see Orrillo (2005). That is, if and only if the following condi-
tion is satisfied: 
 
2( ) ( , ) : ( ) 0 and ( , ) > 0J oNAC R p C R+∃ q j ∈ pq + −p j ≤ q j/
The following characterization of NAC is given in the following lemma due to 
Araujo et al. (2005). 
Lemma 1: There are no arbitrage opportunities if and only if SR ++∈β∃  such that 
 < ( )
j j
s s j s s o j s s s j
s S s S s S
D D p C p Y C
∈ ∈ ∈
β ≤ p β + − β∑ ∑ ∑  (3)
Notice that (3) above implies 
 
> 0, and > 0,o j s s s j o j j
s S
p C p Y C p C j J
∈
− β −p ∀ ∈∑
Since utility functions are assumed to be strictly increasing by (A1), commodity 
prices equal to zero will be ruled out by assumption. We will make the follow-
ing assumptions which will assure the existence of equilibrium without survival 
assumption.  
				•		 = 0, .jC    j J/ ∀ ∈
				•	 ( ) >> 0, .hs ohY w s S∀ ∈∑
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				•	 = 0, ( , ) ; = 0, ( , )j ls sA j s J S Y s l S L/ /∀ ∈ × ∀ ∈ ×
Remarks:   
1.  As the collateral is the only method of enforcing promises (A3) is quite natural: 
any asset which demands no collateral requirement would deliver nothing, and 
therefore will have zero price in equilibrium. Assumption (A4) assures that in 
the second period, in any state of nature, the value of first -period initial social 
endowment6 is strictly positive for any price 0.>sp  Now if we want to relax 
(A4) to become 0>  instead of 0>  we would have to impose a stronger struc-
ture on .sY  Namely, , > 0LsaY R a++∈ ∀ .
2.  Assumption (A5) assures the existence of at least one portfolio7 ),( jq  which 
is always desirable. i.e., a portfolio yielding a non-negative, non-zero pay-off. To 
see this, notice that Lsp ++∆∈  implies that jsD  is strictly positive and bounded 
away from zero. This together with (3) also implies that 0.>jp . In fact:
 Define the sets 1 2= { : > 0}, = { : > 0}
j
sl jlL l L A L l L C∈ ∈  and 0}.>:{=3
l
ls
l YLlL ′∈′  
These sets are all nonempty by (A3) and (A5) respectively. Since ,Lsp ++∆∈  one 
easily has that 
3 2
{( )}( ) > 0min min minll L l L l Ls s j sl jlp Y C Y C′∈ ∈ ∈′≥ . Using the above fact 
one has that 
1
> 0minj jl Ls s slp A A∈≥ . Define asj to be the minimum between 
3 2
{( )}( )min min minll L l L l Lsl jlY C′∈ ∈ ∈′  and 1 > 0min
j
l L slA∈ . This parameter, asj, is strictly 
positive. From the definition of ,jsD  it then follows that 0 < jsj sDa ≤ . This im-
plies that 0>)( j−+q ssss DCYpD  for all .s  This in turn implies that consumers 
will never be satiated in their asset demand. See assumptions A.3. in Gottardi 
and Hens (1996).
3. L e t  A  b e  t he  s e t  o f  a l l  com mo d i t y  -  a s s e t  p r i ce s 
1( , ) = ( , , , , )
L LS J
o Sp p p p R R R++ ++p p ∈ × ×  that admit no arbitrage opportunity. 
That is, those which satisfy Corollary 1. Denote by N  the set 
 {( , ) : , ( , ) }L J Lo sp R R p R s S such that p A++ ++p ∈ × ∃ ∈ ∈ p ∈
 If there is no confusion each time that we write LL RRNp ++++ ××∈p ),(  it will 
be understood that ),( pop  will belong to N  and the prices sp  will belong to 
.1−++
LR  The prices sp  can be assumed to belong to 
L
++∆  without loss of generality 
6 Of course, transformed via sY .
7 Indeed any JR2),( +∈jq  with 0=/q .
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since the second-period budget constraint is unchangeable when sp  is substi-
tuted by spa  for all 0.>a .
4.  It is easy to check that for any SLp R++∈  the set N  is convex.8 Thus, so is the 
set 
 1 1 ( 1)( )L L S L JN R R− − +++ ++ ++ +× ∆ × ∆ ⊂ ×
To abbreviate the notation we will write ( 1)S L−++∆  instead of 
1 1L L SLR− −++ ++ ++∆ × ×∆ ⊂ .
It is convenient to decompose the individual budget set of agent h  into two sets: 
Namely, the set 
 
2( , , , , ) = {( , , ) : ( ) }h h L J ho o o o o o o o oB p A Y x R R p x p C p+p ω q j ∈ × + pq + −p j ≤ ω
is the set of date 0 admissible trades. Note that in this set it is not assumed9 that 
the ex post income is non negative since in the collateral model the ex post financial 
income is always non-negative. i.e., 
 ( ) 0, = 1, ,s s s sD p Y C D s Sq + − j ≥  .
In a similar way the sets of spot s  admissible trades are defined to be 
2( , , , , ) = {( , , ) : ( ) }h h L J ho o o o o o o o oB p A Y x R R p x p C p+p ω q j ∈ × + pq + −p j ≤ ω
The next assumption requires that for all admissible10 first-period commodity 
prices and all asset prices in the closure of ,N  for at least one agent, the set of 
budget feasible asset trades has a nonempty interior. 
(A6) For all 1( , ) [ ],J Lop N h H
+ −
+p ∈ ∩ ∆ ∃ ∈  such that the interior of his/her first-
period budget set ),,,,( YApB ho
h
o ωp  defined by 
 
2{( , , ) : ( ) < }L J ho o o o o ox R R p x p C p+q j ∈ × + pq + −p j ω
is nonempty.
8 Indeed N  is a cone.
9 In contrast to Gottardi and Hens (1996) who do assume and form part of it.
10 Which excludes prices equal to zero since utility functions are strictly increasing by (A1) .
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Similar to Gottardi and Hens Assumption (A6) guarantees that a minimum wealth 
condition is always satisfied for at least one agent. For now we are not concerned 
with the strict positivity of the ex post financial income in a given state because this 
problem will be treated later in Step 2 of the demonstration of Theorem 1.
To end the description of the model we must assume that the economy is resource 
related. This assumption demands that any subset of individuals be endowed with 
resources which can be redistributed to the complementary subset of individuals 
so as to improve their welfare at any feasible allocation, taking into account the 
constraints arising from the default, collateral and market incompleteness.11
Denote by 
 }=1,2=,=:},{=)( 21212 HHHiHHHHHP i ∪∧⊂/φ
the set of all non-trivial partitions of the agents .H
Irreducibility Assumption
We are now ready to establish the notion of irreducibility in our context:
(A7) ),(},{ 221 HPHH ∈∀  ,)( LSHHhho Rx +∈− ∈∀  ( 1)S Lop
−
− ++∀ ∈∆ . 
2( , , ) : ( ) = ( , , ), ; ( , , )h h h L J h h h h h ho s s s S o o o h Hx R R p x R x h H x x F+ + ∈ − ∈∃ q j ∈ × q j ∀ ∈ ∧ j ∈ .
( 1)= ( )h L S Hh Hy y R
+
∈∃ ∈  with 
( 1)= ( , )h h h L Soy y y R
+∈  such that
 = 0 < ( , , , ) >,h h
h H
y p y R p A C Y h H
∈
∧ ∈ ∀ ∈∑  
 10, 0
h h h
o oy y h Hω + ≥ ≥ ∀ ∈
and 2),()~,( HhxCxUyxyCxUa
h
o
hh
o
hhh
o
h
o
hh
o
h ∈∀j+≥++j+ −−
with strict inequality for some .2Hh∈
Assumption (A7) states that at all relevant prices a minimum wealth condition 
holds for all agents.
11 Incompleteness in the collateral model is defined the same way as in the standard GEI model 
with the only difference being that in the collateral model an asset is defined by its promise and 
the collateral that backs it.
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3 The Existence Theorem
Now we are ready to demonstrate our main theorem. We do it in several steps: 
Theorem 1: Under Assumptions A1-A7 the economy E  has an exogenous collateral 
equilibrium. 
Proof:
Step 1: Existence of quasi-equilibrium
Define, for all 1≥n  the following economy sequences 
 1= [( , ( , ( , , ), ( , ), ]
n h hn hn hn
o SE u A C Yω ω ω  
where 
1= ( 1)hn h Lo o Rn ++
ω ω + ∈ , and .,11=~ SsR
n
Lh
s ∈∀∈ω ++  Notice that all the 
assumptions listed in GZ (2002), p. 10 are satisfied. Thus from GZ (2002) it 
follows that each economy 1, ≥nE n  has an equilibrium. Thus, a price sys-
tem ( 1)( , )n n S Lp N −++p ∈ ×∆  and an allocation of consumption and investments 
Hh
h
n
h
n
h
nx ∈jq ),,(  exist such that 
 
1 1= ( 1), = [ 1 ( )], =h h h h h h h hon n o sn s on n n n
h H h H h H h H h H h H
x C x Y x C
n n∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
+ j ω + + + j q j∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
and ),,( hn
h
n
h
nx jq  maximize ),( ooh xCxU −j+  subject to 
 
( )
n
ol
n n n n n h l L
o o o o o
p
p x p C p
n
∈+ p q + −p j ≤ ω +
∑
 
.,)(1 SsxYpDCYpD
n
xp os
n
s
n
ss
n
s
n
ss
n
s ∈+j−+q+≤
It is useful to point out that in GZ (2002) the set N  does not appear explicitly. 
The optimality condition of each consumer, in each economy ,nE  implies that the 
prices .),( Np nno ∈p  See Orrillo (2005).
From the remark of Definition 2, the optimality of ),,( hn
h
n
h
nx jq  is equivalent to the 
two following conditions: for all Hh∈  one has 
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1( , ) > ( , ) and ( ( )) = ( ) ,h h n h h n no o on n on s s s o sU x C x U x C x p x Y x C D s Sn− −
+ j + j − + j q −j + ∈
                                                ⇓
 (4))(>)( hn
nn
o
h
n
nnn
o
n CpCp jp−+qpjp−+qp  (4)
 
( ) = 0
n
ol
n h n n h n h l L
n o n o o
p
p C p
n
∈p q + −p j + ω +
∑
 1and ( ( )) = ( ) ,n h h h n h hs sn s on n s n np x Y x C D s Sn
− + j q −j + ∈  (5)
Notice that under A1, Item 2 of remark12 of Assumption (A5), (4) and (5) imply 
the validity of
 ,Ss∈∀
 1( , , , , , ) > ( , )
h h h h h h h h h
on n n sn Sn on n onU x C x x x U x C x−+ j + j 
                               ⇓
 ( ( )) > ( ( ))n n h h hs s s o s sn s on np x Y x C p x Y x C+ + j + + j  (6)
Letting13 ,∞→n  from the compactness of the price domain, the non-nullity of 
collateral and the feasible allocations set one has 
 Sspp
L
s
n
s ∈∆∈→ −+ ,1
 Npp
JL
o
nn
o ∩∆∈p→p −++ 1),(),(
 ( , , ) ( , , )
h h hh h h
n n nx xq j → q j
where markets clear at the original economy E  
12 Which concludes that consumers will never be satiated in their assets demand. 
13 Passing to a subsequence if necessary.
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 )6.(=)],([=,= ′jqj+ωj+ ∑∑∑∑∑∑
∈∈∈∈∈∈
h
Hh
h
Hh
hh
os
Hh
h
s
Hh
h
o
Hh
hh
o
Hh
CxYxCx  (6')
As in Gottardi and Hens (1996), we can take limit (passing to a subsequence if 
necessary) when ∞→n  in14 (4), (5) and (6). Thus, one has that for all Hh∈  the 
following is true: 
( , ) ( , ) and ( ( )) = ( ),
n h hh h
so oo o s s osU x C x U x C x p x Y x C D s S−−+ j ≥ + j − + j q −j ∈
                     ⇓
(7))()(
h
o
h
o CpCp jp−+qp≥jp−+qp  (7)
( ) = 0 and ( ( )) = ( ),
h h h h h h hh
ss oo so o sp C p p x Y x C D s Spq + −p j + ω − + j q −j ∈  (8)
 ),(),,,,,( 1
h
o
hh
o
hh
Ss
hhh
o
h xCxUxxxCxU −j+≥j+ 
                                 ⇓
 ))(9)(()((
hh
os
h
ssosss CxYxpCxYxp j++≥j++  (9)
Conditions (7) and (8) say that agents' asset holdings and consumption levels are 
minimizing expenditure, respectively, at date 0 and at date 1 in state .Ss∈  Thus 
we can claim that )),,(;,( Hh
hhh
xp ∈jqp  is a quasi-equilibrium for our exogenous 
collateral economy .E
Step 2: From quasi-equilibrium to equilibrium
Assumption (A4) and market clear conditions in both asset markets and first-period 
commodity markets imply that there is at least one agent Hh∈  for which 
 0>)()(
hh
oss
hh
s CxYpD j++j−q
otherwise 0)( ≤ω∑ ∈ hoHhssYp  contrad ict ing (A4). This impl ies that
),,,,,( ss
hhh
os
h
s YAxpB jq  is nonempty. Thus a standard argument implies that cost 
14 Notice that in (4) and (6) the continuity of agents'utility functions has been used .
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minimization (9) implies utility maximization. That is, (6) holds in each state for 
h  when s
n
s pp =  and .=
hh
n xx  Strict monotonicity then implies that 0.>op−
In what follows we prove that (4) and (5) remain held15 at ( , , ),
h h h
x h Hq j ∀ ∈ . This 
together with (6') will imply that the quasi-equilibrium found is an equilibrium.
From (A6) it follows that at prices ),( pop  there is at least one agent h  who can 
afford the portfolio ),( hh jq  such that .<)( hoo
h
o
h
oo pCpxp ωjp−+qp+  Thus the 
interior of ),,,,( YApB hoo
h
o ωp  is nonempty. Cost minimization (7) then implies util-
ity maximization (4). Strict monotonicity again then implies that >> 0, >> 0op p  
and > 0,jjop C j−p ∀ .
Step 3: The non-emptiness of the interior of set hoB  for all agents
We will show that ,Hh∈∀  the interior of ),,,,( YApB hoo
h
o ωp  is nonempty. This 
ends the proof of the main theorem. (In fact), define the following sets 
 }=),,,,(:{=1 φωp∈ YApintBHhH
h
oo
h
o
 }=),,,,(:{=:= 12 φ/ωp∈ YApintBHhHH
h
oo
h
o
c
From (A6) it follows that 2H  is a nonempty set. Therefore, 
 .,<)(:),,( 2HhsomeforpCpxpx
h
o
h
o
hh
oo
hhh
o ∈ωjp−+qp+jq∃
Suppose that the claim is false, that is .=1 φ/H  Therefore the partition },{ 21 HH  
is not trivial. Then, from (A7) we can guarantee the existence of transfers 
HhSs
h
s
h
o
h yyyy ∈∈ ))(,(=(=  with 0=
h
Hh
y∑ ∈  and the existence of first-period 
consumption - investment ),,( hhhox jq  such that 
 .(10);,)(= HhSsDCYpDxYpyp hsss
h
s
h
oss
h
ss ∈∀∈j−+q+  (10)
Furthermore, 
 1, , 0,
h h h
o o sh H y y s S∀ ∈ ω + ≥ ∈
15 That is, Hh
hhh
x ∈jq ),,(  are optimal choices for the respective agents.
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and 
 2 , ( , ( ) ) ( , )
h h h h h h h h h h
o o o s s S o oh H U x C y x y U x C x− ∈ −∀ ∈ + j + + ≥ + j  (11)
with strict inequality for some .2Hh∈
We also know that )),,(;,( Hh
hhh
xp ∈jqp  is a quasi-equilibrium. Therefore from 
(10) and (11) it follows that 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )
h h hh h h h
o o oo o op x x p C p+ + p q +q + −p j +j ≥ ω  (12)
On the other hand, (A6) implies that ),,(
hhh
x jq  maximizes the utility of agents 
of .2H  Thus, ,2Hh∈∀  
 ( , ) ( , )
h h h h h hh h h h
o o o oo sU x C y x y U x C x− −+ j + + ≥ + j  (13)
and
( ) = ( ) ( ) ( )( ),
h h hh h hh h
s so os s s ss s sp x y p Y x x D p Y C D s S+ + + q +q + − j +j ∈  (14)
implies 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) >
h h hh hh h
o o oo o op x y p C p+ + p q +q + −p j +j ω  (15)
Summing among all agents of 2H  we have 
(16)>)()()()(
2222
h
o
Hh
o
hh
Hh
o
hh
Hh
h
o
h
o
Hh
o pCpyxp ωj+jp−+q+qp++ ∑∑∑∑
∈∈∈∈
 (16)
The following is true 
 
[ ] = , = 0 and ( ) = 0
h h h hh h
o o o
h H h H h H h H
x C y
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
+ j ω q −j∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
( ) = 0h h
h H∈
q −j∑ . The last equality implied by (10) and by the fact that 
= 0,hsh H y s S∈ ∈∑ . Using these previous facts inequality (16)implies 
(17)<)()()()(
1111
h
o
Hh
o
hh
Hh
o
hh
Hh
h
o
h
o
Hh
o pCpyxp ωj+jp−+q+qp++ ∑∑∑∑
∈∈∈∈
 (17)
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In consequence, there exists 1Hho ∈  such that 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) <
h h hh hh ho o oo oo oo o oo o op x y p C p+ + p q +q + −p j +j ω  (18)
In other words 
 (( , , , , ) =
h ho
o oointB p A Y /p ω φ
which implies that 1Hho ∈/  which is a contradiction because .1Hho ∈  This contra-
diction, however, is caused for having supposed .=1 φ/H  Finally .=1 φH  Thus, the 
claim follows and the theorem as well.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have demonstrated the existence of collateral equilibrium in a GEI 
model with default and collateral when the agents have no future income and the 
first-period social initial endowment is the boundary of the consumption set. Due 
to the fact that the first-period social initial endowment is not strictly positive, 
Geanakoplos and Zame's (2002) existence theorem cannot be applied.
The non satiated condition of the asset demand of consumers in this paper is 
implied by assumptions on collateral, assets structure and structure depreciation 
instead of being an hypothesis as in Gottardi and Hens (1996).
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Appendix A
A.1 Miscellaneous Notation
Let nRx∈  be a vector. We write 0>x  to mean that 0≥x  and 0.=/x . The 
vector 1−− ∈ nj Rx  is the vector x  where the −j  coordinate has been drooped. 
The same holds for bundles of vectors. If 1= ( , , )
mn
mx x x R∈  then kx−  is the 
bundle x  where the −k  th vector of nR  has been drooped. By abuse of no-
tation, we always use the same letter for both set and its cardinality. Thus, we 
will always write: = {1, , }A A . For 1= ( , , ) , ;
JL L J
J jC C C R C R R∈ ∈ j∈  
and LLRY ×∈ , we set: = , =L Lj j jj J j JC C R YC YC R∈ ∈j j ∈ ∈∑ ∑ . For any two 
vectors 
=1
, , = mm i iix y R xy x y R∈ ∈∑  is the usual scalar product. Therefore, 
, =L j jj Jp R pC pC∈∀ ∈ j j∑ .
The set 1
=1
:= { : = 1}mm m iix R x
−
+ +∆ ∈ ∑  is the non-negative simplex of ,mR  
and 11 = −+++
−
++ ∆∩∆ mmm R  is the interior of the simplex .1−+∆m  The map 
jmimkmm
ji RRRR ×→××Π 1, :  is the linear projection on the i – th and j – th 
factors defined as .),,(=,),(= 11, k
mm
k
m
j
m
ijiji RRxxxRRxxx ××∈×∈Π   If 
nmRM ×∈  is a matrix of order ,nm×  and nm RyR ∈∈β ,  are any two vectors, in 
the product My Rβ ∈ , the vector β  will be a line vector and y  a column vector. 
Finally, nR∈1  is the vector whose coordinates are all equals 1.
